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Abstract
Russia’s position in the world is determined by her relations with the US, with both the
Democrats and the Communists expecting some form of parity. But the US has not defeated
Russia in the Cold War to concede parity. The US unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in
2001; the START negotiations have lost meaning; NATO has been steadily expanded over
Russian objections; and Russia has accepted US bases in Central Asia. Russia can seek solace in
the NMD not yet being technologically convincing, in NATO being too flabby for action and
Russia herself being a part of NATO, in the terrorist threat of the Taliban being eliminated, and in
the absence of direct confrontation with the US. Therefore Russia has turned her attention to con-
ventional capability to beat off threats like the Chechen insurgency and to reforming the army.
Russia’s dealing with Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have more to do with commercial calcu-
lations than challenges to the US. Her special relationships with China and India, the ones that
are genuinely independent of US, are likewise driven by the commercial issue of large scale arms
sales rather than strategic considerations, although the latter are always kept in view in case they
have to be activated.
I
The logic of the defeat in the Cold War in 1985-91 inexorably works its way as Russian po-
licy choices are governed by analogy with great power defeats in history. The first of the alternati-
ves was to accept the defeat and attempt a recovery and reassertion, as did Prussia after 1806,
Russia after 1856 and 1918, and Germany after 1919. The other was to accept defeat and collabo-
rate with the victors in a new power bloc, as did Britain after the American War of Independence,
France after 1815, Germany and Japan after 1945, and even Britain and France after 1945 since
their victory led to irreversible decline and to their status as auxiliaries of the USA in the manner
of Germany and Japan.
Russian politics was polarized around these alternatives, as if other options were not availa-
ble or possible. Broadly speaking, the Communists chose the first one of recovery and reasser-
tion, and the Democrats the second one of recovery and collaboration, with the premise of reco-
very to European levels of development being held in common. The Democrats could and did
present their positions as a victory, not over the USA or the West, but over a Communism that was
polemically portrayed as Stalinist, totalitarian, and stagnant. The Communists could project no
victory of any kind, not even over their own inadequacies. The Democrats expected and promised
that their great triumph would result in Western bounty in the quantity and quality that resuscita-
ted Germany and Japan after 1945 and ensured their stability, prosperity, and security over the
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next half century. To make it more feasible, Russia would shed the dross of the less developed and
“Asiatic” regions of the Soviet Union, that is especially Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The dis-
solution of what began to be called the Soviet Empire and the subordination to the USA was pre-
mised on a logic that seemed flawless by historical analogy.
It was the culmination of the struggle for the mastery of the world that was conducted from
the end of the nineteenth century by the six great or imperialist powers, the USA, the UK, France,
Germany, Russia, and Japan. There were too many competitors for a globalized world; World
War I did not solve the problem, which was then carried over to World War II under different ide-
ological banners; and the partial solution emerged with four of the rivals knocked out of the con-
test, leaving behind just the USA and the USSR in the lists. Nuclear power made a hot war bet-
ween them impossible; accordingly the great joust continued as a Cold War between the
principals and proxy hot wars by clients until the bitter end in 1991 leaving a clear winner.
During the Cold War however, the two super powers enjoyed something akin to a condomi-
nium of the world. The silver lining in Democratic defeatism was the hope, advertised as an ex-
pectation, that the history, size, resources, and capacity of Russia would ensure that she become
more a partner to the USA after the fashion of the Cold War condominium than prosperous vas-
sals like the Europeans or a regional power like China. The Democrats thus offered more than the
Communists could: European prosperity over Soviet social security, capitalist dynamism in lieu
of socialist stagnation, access to the world instead of parochial isolation, and possibly even the
condominium of the world through peaceful collaboration instead of debilitating arms races and
confrontation. They were making an offer that few could refuse!
Not only does history not repeat itself, whether as tragedy or farce, but in this case the ana-
logy was inadequate and self-serving to both the contestants. Both have ignored what is perhaps
the decisive aspect of the recovery of Europe and Japan after World War II. They were reconstruc-
ted, not as an end in itself, but as Cold War strategy against the single antagonist in the Soviet
Union and Communism. After the Cold War, there is no such single focus, and there would be no
compulsion to reconstruct Russia beyond ensuring stability for nuclear security, containing terro-
rism, policing the neighbourhood (Transcaucasia and Central Asia), peacekeeping, combating or-
ganized crime, and insulating the prosperous world from lean and hungry immigrants. The US
victory at the end of the twentieth century is unique in history. It has never before happened that a
single power has been left with no possible competitor anywhere on the planet. It would defeat
the purpose of such a victory to reconstruct the defeated party as a potential challenger once
again. Collaboration would be meaningful only in conditions of effective subordination, as in the
case of Europe to USA, or limitation, as with India and China. Russian recovery in the absence of
a further overarching contest presages both insubordination and super power capacity. The USA
could not possibly endorse a Russian recovery and reconstruction in strategic terms.
Both Democrats and Communists have further ignored two other likely possibilities. The
first was another famous historical route, that of extinction, as happened with the Ottoman and
Hapsburg Empires, reduced to the nation states of Turkey and Austria respectively, and recom-
mended by diehard cold warriors like Zbigniew Brzezinski who want to see Russia contract to
European Russia. The further relevance of the analogy is that their decline lasted a century and a
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half until their final extinction in the aftermath of World War I. Naturally enough, none in Russia
could contemplate such a future. The second is the most realistic possibility of all, that Russia
shall dwindle into a regional power in the league of China and India without recovery to
European levels or partnership with the USA. This is the legacy that Gorbachev and Yeltsin have
left to Putin.
II
Russia’s global position and much of her domestic evolution is now governed by the relation
with the US and the multilateral institutions and alliance systems dominated by the US. After the
defeat and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the persecution and attenuation of the Communist
Party, and the further dismantling of Soviet state and economic structures through “regionaliza-
tion” and privatization respectively, the next major US priority has been achieved. Russia in effect
lost strategic parity when the US withdrew on 13 December 2001 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972. The militarization of space has begun in right earnest; and capacity in nuclear and
air power, or in missile systems based on land, in the sea, or in the air, are no ultimate protection
from missiles based in space. Russia was not afforded even the fig leaf of a joint revision of the
ABM Treaty, and it was made clear to both the Russian public and the wider world that funda-
mental strategic questions would be decided unilaterally by the US. The Russian response has
been resigned and sober. Russia has consoled herself with the observation that the US National
Missile Defence system is still being tested and Russia is still in fact secure.
In such circumstances, arms reduction talks and agreements have diminished in significance.
START 1, was signed in 1991, entered into force in 1994, and is the only one of the strategic arms
reduction treaties that have been carried out fully, with both sides reducing accountable offensive
arms levels to 6000 warheads each. START 2, signed in 1993, fixed an upper limit of 3000-3500
deployed warheads; but it never came into force. START 3 discussions were begun in 1999 but
were superceded by the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002. This
set the limits at 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012; but Putin had already offered the
low figure of 1500 in November 2000 itself, and such low figures may be inferred from Russian
budgets. Nuclear deterrence is changing in meaning; and “unacceptable damage” now seems to
be possible whether the levels are 1500, 3500, or 6000. It suggests that the USA and Russia are no
longer targets to each other; it also implies, but not yet stated as such, that when NMD shall take
effect, if it does eventually, such deterrence would be of little meaning and would be relegated to
low priority.
As Russia submits to US strategic priorities, she has abandoned any attempt at positioning
herself militarily in space, is gradually reducing the scope of her space research and exploration
programme, and commits herself to progressive strategic arms reductions. Her main security con-
cern is no longer the US; and even if it were, she is confident for the present that she has the capa-
city to inflict “unacceptable damage.” Her security problems arise more from the conventional
sources of secession, terrorism, proliferation, and organized crime. Her military and armament
requirements in these fields are of a kind for which Soviet structures have not prepared her, and
the Chechen “ulcer” exposes all of them with the density of a black hole.
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Putin therefore has been nudging his military establishment by gradual degrees to accept
this dramatic shift of focus. In 2000, the issue of strategic versus conventional forces was thras-
hed out between Sergeyev, the defence minister, and Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of general
staff, and Putin tipped the balance in favour of conventional forces leading to the eventual repla-
cement of Sergeyev by Sergei Ivanov. That argument remains valid to this day, that precious re-
sources were being squandered on accumulating ICBMs, SS-27s, and SS-25s which were never
to be used, while items urgently needed for the uninterrupted haemorrhage in Chechnya, be they
attack helicopters, fixed wing aircraft for fog, body armour, or steel helmets, or more advanced
assets, like smart weapons, could not be acquired even when produced by the Russian defence
industry. The Chechen insurgency mingling with waves of terrorism and organized crime has
reinforced these arguments many times over. While the choice in favour of conventional military
development is gaining ground, superior Russian skills in various advanced but underused tech-
nologies are available on the world market, whether for India, China, or even Iran and the USA.
These may lead to acrimonious disputes and hard bargains with the US, but they should not be
mistaken for strategic challenges: they are maximally commercial ventures, political postures,
bargaining positions, and individual or institutional entrepreneurship which is called corruption
in certain circles.
But the transition to contract or volunteer forces from conscript forces is tortuous and bit-
terly contested. In the event of an emergency, a new system of reserves and mobilization would
have to be available; and it would have to integrate training with civilian higher educational ins-
titutions. Subsistence salaries of 1000 roubles a month would have to rise manifold to attract
youth of appropriate quality. Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Wing Forces, has
suggested something in the region of 7000 roubles a month. In addition, infrastructure and pro-
vision for families would need to be provided for, with schools, crèches, jobs for wives and
much else. The costs are prohibitive, and conscription is easier despite its obvious drawbacks.
But the endemic crisis and ineffectiveness of the army imposes hard decisions, and Putin deci-
ded in November 2001 that the conversion must be undertaken. It began with the Pskov Airborne
Division in September 2002; and in July 2003, a timetable was set, by which at least half of the
army would be on contract by 2007 and military service would be reduced from two years to one
year. There has been strong resistance from the military establishment, but Putin has overridden
them.
The problem with re-orientation to conventional forces does not end there. So far conventio-
nal military preparedness has been premised on a NATO attack, or an invasion which was to be
countered by overwhelming force on land, sea, and air, and, in the event of failure, by nuclear at-
tack. The military reiterated its meaning by staging the grandiose West ’99 Belarus-Russia exer-
cise to hold off NATO at all three levels of ground, sea, and air, apparently in response to the
Kosovo war of 1999. It did so yet again from 20 January 2004, when all conventional forces and
strategic forces including cruise missiles were thrown into the colossal “Operation Shield” exer-
cise apparently to test responses to the American National Missile Defence system. Critics have
suggested that these are perhaps sops to the military and more of an exercise to attract votes as
Putin heads for election in March 2004. These may also be technically necessary since Russian
ICBMs are up to 30 years old and have to be periodically test fired to check for efficiency. The
testing thus takes the form of an exercise. It suits everybody.
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The conscript army of more than a million, their training and doctrine were all however based
on assumptions which the majority of the military establishment continue to affirm as valid, but
which critics, including Putin, dismiss as obsolete. Insurgency, terror, and crime cannot be dete-
rred or defeated by nuclear power or vast conventional forces. They need rapid action professio-
nal volunteer units with sophisticated training, not masses of ill-trained conscripts and millions of
reserves; they require a different range of specialized military hardware like reconnaissance-at-
tack systems, military transport and multi-purpose combat planes, and high-precision weaponry;
and the rigid distinction between armed forces for external defence and internal security must
fade.
The argument on the conversion to a contract army contains important strategic choices over
and above the obvious financial ones. If neither the existence nor the territory of Russia is any
longer threatened, and she must prepare more for insurgency, terror, and crime, she would be slip-
ping into the position of the Europeans in relation to America. As Condoleezza Rice put it in 2000
during the presidential election campaign, America would fight the wars, and the Europeans
would follow up with the peacekeeping. The military would become yet another Soviet relic,
which in effect it has already become.
The dilemma for Russian strategic planners is painful. What if American military might were
to be turned on Russia in the manner it has been on Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999, Afghanistan in
2001, and Iraq in 1990 and 2003, and may well be on Iran; and how could Russia respond to a th-
reat from China? The answer of the Democrats within Russia, and generally of various western
centres of power is that these dangers have dissipated with the Cold War, that integration with the
West forecloses such possibilities, and that in the last resort, at least against China, the nuclear op-
tion remains. The Military Doctrine and the National Security Concept were both revised in 2000
to reaffirm the nuclear option, the first when the conventional threat was too great, and the second
when other means to hold off aggression were inadequate. The process of arriving at choices is
tortuous and marked by bitter dispute, but its direction seems to be steadily heading away from
Soviet levels of independence to European forms of dependence and integration.
III
The Russian response to NATO expansion fits into this pattern of protest and eventual quiet
submission. This has occurred so far in three phases. Russia signed the NATO Partnership for
Peace Initiative in June 1994 and participated in the Implementation Force and its successor, the
Stabilization Force (SFOR), in Bosnia in 1995. May 1997 saw the NATO-Russia Founding Act
leading to higher levels of co-operation and a Russian voice in NATO councils. Yeltsin presented
this to the Russian public as the elimination of the NATO threat since Russia must be involved in
any decision; but NATO and American officials never failed to repeat the brutal clarification of
Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, that this represented a “voice not veto” for Russia.
This co-operation or integration has been taken a notch higher with the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) in May 2002 to deal with terrorist threats, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms
control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, mili-
tary-to-military co-operation, defence reform, civil emergency response, and new threats and
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challenges (including scientific co-operation and airspace management). It is an index of Western
confidence in Russian subordination that Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General, can now say
in October 2002 that Russia is part of the solution, not of the problem, as he looks forward to
more intensified collaboration in handling terror strikes and weapons of mass destruction among
other issues of high priority to the West. And Putin had already declared in 2000 that Russia was
prepared to join NATO.
NATO expansion in the first phase to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was
received with horror in Russia as Western betrayal and aggression. As the Democrats saw it then,
NATO should have disbanded itself in response to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It was a
“gentleman’s agreement” as Gorbachev naively expressed it, and there were periodic reminders
of the fate of the Weimar Republic; but such complaints fatally ignored the reality of victory and
defeat in the Cold War. If NATO remained a threat, Russia suffered from reduced warning time
for anti-ballistic missiles systems, the Russian cities of Kursk, Briansk, and Smolensk were
highly vulnerable, the Russian Baltic Fleet was hemmed in with strategic Polish ports in hostile
hands, and NATO tactical nuclear weapons could be deployed on the new territories so much clo-
ser to Russia. As if to illustrate the danger, NATO twice attacked in Yugoslavia, in the Bosnian
War in 1995 and the Kosovo War in 1999 to the chagrin and outrage of Russia. While Russian pu-
blic opinion was shocked beyond belief that their fellow Orthodox Slavs and anti-fascist brot-
hers-in-arms were being hounded and bombed by the unholy alliance of Cold War and World War
II foes, Russian strategists had concerns beyond such comradely sympathy. They were bothered
that the West took unilateral decisions in an area in which Russia had declared her close interest;
and they were anxious lest these become the first of a series of NATO interventions. Yet Russia
has participated in NATO peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo although Russia’s Serbian
“brothers” are at a disadvantage in that process, a disadvantage that Russians expect to mitigate.
Their presence is slender and something of a token, with just 1,200 out of 20,000 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and 3,600 out of 40,000 in the Kosovo force (KFOR). It is a symbolism that satisfies
both parties, the Russians that they are not isolated, and the West for having Russia hitched to
their chariot.
Beyond such face-saving formulae, it is clear that Russia has had to participate in her own hu-
miliation by acting as a very junior partner of the very foe she loudly denounced. The only ana-
logy is Germany participating in all the causes of liberal democracy against totalitarianism which
includes her own National Socialist past and any putative revivals. But Germany has been recons-
tructed by repudiating and being ceaselessly required to repudiate that nazi legacy; and post-War
Germany presents 1945 as a victory over nazism, not over the Germany that exists today. Russian
Democrats and the western ideological machines pursue a symmetrical argument with respect to
Soviet socialism through totalitarian theory; but since the Cold War victory was not total in the
manner of 1945, the fact of such an ideological victory has to be demonstrated until its meaning is
fully internalized in Russia. Russian resistance and grumbling about NATO is an index of lessons
not learnt and the need to drive the point home further. The defeat in the Cold War is not total and
final as a single event, as 1945 was over fascism and nazism; it is instead processual.
Accordingly, the two seemingly contradictory processes go on simultaneously: NATO ex-
pansion apparently against Russia, and Russian integration into that same NATO. The continued
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existence of NATO into the nineties, and therefore presumably of a further defeat and decline of
Russia, saw a 40% Russian public opinion vote in favour of joining NATO and the Partnership for
Peace, both in 1994. This helped in neutralizing Russian objections to both the unilateral NATO
strike against Bosnia in September 1995 and the exclusion of Russia from jointly managing the
Bosnian crisis, and in ensuring Russian participation in Bosnian peacekeeping from 1995. The
admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO to the dismay of Russia was ac-
companied by the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997 by which Russia secured a “voice
not veto.” The admission not only of Slovenia, Rumania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, but also of the
Soviet territory of the three Baltic Republics in November 2002 virtually coincides with the dee-
per Russian integration into NATO structures through the NATO-Russia Council of May 2002.
There is an evident convergence between Russian and Western strategists against their res-
pective “diehards”. The indefinite expansion of NATO to the extent of Russia joining it suggests
the obsolescence of NATO by deliberate over extension; but it satisfies all those in search of secu-
rity. Western triumphalists see Russia pushed to the wall apparently; East European states feel se-
cure in NATO against Russian revanchism; and Russia feels reassured through inclusion in vir-
tually all NATO structures. Such a gargantuan alliance is too flabby for effective offensive
military action; but it can do all else like peacekeeping. Hence America is setting a new trend of
acting virtually independently and cobbling together variable alliances for each campaign. Its ac-
tion against Iraq in 1990 and 2003, Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, were all based on ad hoc
groupings assembled for the moment. In a sense then, Putin’s policy, as indeed of Yeltsin, of tur-
ning an apparently unending defeat and decline into an advantage by merging with the victor, is
paying dividends at one strategic level at least. The menace of NATO dwindles as it expands.
This outcome is not significantly qualified by a series of compensatory actions that Russia
pursues. Thus both the Military Doctrine and the National Security Concept have been margi-
nally revised to more aggressive postures in 2002 to emphasize the nuclear option. Massive mili-
tary exercises like the West ’99 have been carried out in response to simulated NATO attacks. The
potential in the Russia-China-India triangle grouping is regularly investigated. The Shanghai
Group has evolved steadily into a stable consultative forum for a sub-strategic level of Central
Asian questions. The Commonwealth of Independent States, despite its hopelessly toothless na-
ture, continues to function as a base for periodic ad hoc groupings put together by Russia. And
Russia sustains a vigorous diplomacy and sometimes collaboration with what America has ter-
med the “rogue states”, now the “axis of evil’, that is, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. But every one
of these pass under the overarching relation with the USA whose strategic priorities are never th-
warted, not even in dealings with the “rogues.”
IV
This master-slave dialectic of improvement through submission was demonstrated dramati-
cally in Central Asia after the al-Qaeda attack on the USA in September 2001. In one swift move
Russia invited the US to base itself militarily in Central Asia and to begin reorienting both the do-
mestic politics and the geopolitics of the region. It at once achieved what Russia had not been able
to achieve all these ten years. It rooted out the sources of jihad and terror in Afghanisatan, it brus-
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quely dismissed Pakistani dreams of Curzonian strategic depth in Central Asia, and it compelled
the US and its European auxiliaries to accept the Russian campaign in Chechnya. Russia and the
US are now partners in a domain that is a strategic priority to both. But the price was severe, in-
deed almost the same as Russia has had to pay since perestroika. Russia lost exclusive rights in
Central Asia, to become junior partner to the US in that vital region. The Shanghai Co-operation
Organization (SCO), consisting of Russia, China, and four Central Asian states has given itself
the main task of combating Islamic militancy, with the secondary objective of containing
American hegemony. But, given the American leadership of the crusade against extremist Islam,
this must function under American aegis, even if without direct American participation.
Containing America, in such circumstances, must atrophy, even as pious statement. Russia had
been excluded entirely from Europe and Yugoslavia, which was in fact her grievance; but is being
readmitted gradually and most cautiously through NATO structures in a subordinate capacity. In
Central Asia, the principle of joint management of crisis has been accepted from the outset, albeit
under American leadership and with always an element of uncertainty whether it would mutate
into American unilateralism. But Russia has derived some satisfaction from the fact of both joint
management and the freedom it permitted in Chechnya.
The US is now in a position to do in the Near Abroad what it has managed these fifteen years
in Europe. It oscillated between excluding Russia from the region by direct “management” or
functioning through Russia. The depth of the Russian presence did not make it easy to exclude
Russia in the manner it had been from Europe. The patented US instrument for the purpose was
human rights and civil society, or the proliferation of non-state actors in the political realm, which
permits penetration by US and European organizations in infinite series against the far more limi-
ted Russian or other local resources to do the same. But this also included the dangerously dou-
ble-edged one of jihad based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, useful in part because of its yeoman
service in defeating the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and possibly of use by extension in the
region generally to douse Russian great power aspirations. Partnership with Russia was more
pragmatic and stable, but Russia resisted for long on the ground that this was a traditional sphere
of Russian influence. Unilateral American action in the area would have aroused Russian hosti-
lity on a scale greater than in Yugoslavia. The al-Qaeda attack on America converted Russian opi-
nion, both official and of the public, into accepting the American presence. The USA has profited
enormously in strategic terms from the terrorist attack on itself; Russia also has, but to a lesser ex-
tent. The European pattern of Russian co-ordination with the US has now extended to the Russian
soft underbelly.
Islamic militancy is likely to remain a decisive factor in the near future. In the absence of a
universal redemptive creed like socialism, this becomes a potent instrument against the see-
mingly eternal profanity and humiliating domination of the West. Roman Catholicism grew into
such a role in East Europe, chiefly Poland and Lithuania, against Orthodox and imperial Russia
and Soviet socialism. Not surprisingly, Roman Catholicism and Islam were deployed to enor-
mous effect against Soviet domination. East European Roman Catholicism could be comfortably
integrated into the structures of European civil society since that process had already taken place
through the secularization of the western world in the nineteenth century. It delivered Poland and
Lithuania from bondage in East Europe and vindicated the Cold War campaigns of West Europe.
Those same structures however appeared in much of the Islamic world as the perpetuation of de-
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privation and of cultural humiliation. Islamic militancy is one of the reflections of the parochia-
lism of socialism and of liberalism, of the post-modern doctrines of emancipation, and of the
asymmetries of world-wide development. At the same time, Islam is being constructed as the
principal challenger to what is described as Western civilization and its loudly trumpeted values
of freedom and democracy and to substitute for communism which had discharged that function
until the end of the Cold War. Islam has been cast in a role that makes it a target and compels it to
fulfil itself as one despite itself. The latest version of civilization theory at the hands of Samuel
Huntington, regurgitated yet again after the Cold War despite more than a century of damaging
criticism of its inadequacies, has accorded to Islam that dubious honour.
The strategy has been sharply focused by isolating a posited militant essence to Islam, discer-
ning its universal manifestations, and calling for a world-wide crusade against it. Putin preceded
Bush in this matter by identifying such isomorphous groups throughout the Islamic world from
Indonesia, through Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Arab countries to Chechnya.
After the al-Qaeda attack in September 2001, Bush has transmitted that same message with all
the resources of the US at his command. They now use the same language of instructions to their
military chiefs, employ the same rhetoric, and pursue the same easily identifiable enemy. Russia
has accepted subordination in Central Asia also; but she has the satisfaction of seeing the fulfil-
ment of one set of strategic objectives, the end to Islamic militancy in the region, even as it surren-
ders another set, that of hegemony. On the other hand in Europe Russia experienced only surren-
der of positions to NATO, not fulfilment of objectives. Islamic militancy and terror have perhaps
united America and Russia far beyond what the rhetoric of “universal human values” and “Our
Common European Home” ever did.
V
Russia being embroiled with terror and Islamic militancy brings us to the question of
Chechnya. On the face of it this should not have been a strategic issue at all, even as an insur-
gency. It can not threaten the existence of Russia or of any vital interest; and it should have remai-
ned a local insurgency, however incompetent and corrupt the Russian army had become to deal
with it. But even this has passed under the over-riding US-Russia relationship in two ways.
The first was the possibility of the West using Chechnya as leverage against Russia. This is
occurring on a muted scale through the usual human rights interventions. Radio Liberty broad-
casts to Chechnya, Chechen offices and conferences function in Europe, and Chechen guerillas
find safe haven and passage for their arms supplies in Georgia. Given her numerous approaches to
the West, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and her keenness to join NATO, Georgia is
very open to suggestion by the West. These tensions between Russia and the West through
Georgia and Chechnya locate them as it were in the traditional spheres of US-Russia relations and
great power politics.
The second is the Islamic militancy which has added a twist to the complex story. Chechnya
is largely Muslim, but the insurgency is essentially a secular one that exploits the politics and cri-
minal establishment in Moscow and elsewhere to good effect. But Russia is a common target to
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jihadis from Central Asia and Afghanistan and to Chechen insurgents. In search of funding, gueri-
llas have made good use of the mafia in Moscow, but also of financiers from the Islamic world.
The jihad has thus spilled into Chechnya also; and Moscow has long been trying to persuade the
rest of the world that Russia is fighting that hydra in Chechnya. September 2001 made that case
so much more persuasive; but the US was less ready still to accept it as such than to strike a bar-
gain with Moscow that they would limit human rights criticisms for the sake of support in the new
Afghan war. The Russian case advanced a step farther when in February 2002 the US announced
that al-Qaeda had found shelter in Georgia, in the Pankisi Gorge, which Russia had always de-
nounced as a hideout for Chechen terrorists. It has led to US commitments in the region beyond
pipeline politics and leverage against Moscow. At once two hundred US men began training a
Georgian Rapid Deployment Force of 1500 men and border guards of 500 to gain control of the
Pankisi Gorge and root out al-Qaeda. The Pankisi itself is set about 70 km deep into Georgia and
has been maintained by the Georgian security and interior ministries as a safe haven for organized
crime by never entering the area themselves but extracting bribes at the entrance. Chechens are
free there, not so much due to the malevolence of the Georgian government as to the criminality
of its administration. This growing identity of interest between the US and Russia has been furt-
her consolidated by the Chechen hostage taking crisis in Moscow in October 2002 leaving 118
Russians and all 50 Chechens dead. To the European and American public at least, Russia and the
West were fighting the same cause. The Bali bombing merely further reinforced the same point.
As long as the same groups are targeting Western and Russian interests, Russia secures im-
portant support in her campaign in Chechnya. But once again, it has both led to and exposed
Russian dependence on US priorities. Russia has not been able to develop the capacity to stamp
out the Chechen insurgency, whether politically or militarily; her army is too ill-equipped, ill-
trained and corrupt to be able to do so; and Russian politics exerts its baleful influence here. It has
often been reported that the insurgents buy their arms from underpaid Russian forces; and dissi-
dent Russian political manipulators, financiers, and others are engaged in Chechnya to embarrass
opponents in Moscow. The US has rushed in to help Georgia against al-Qaeda, but not Russia; it
is doing no more than toning down its propaganda machine; and Russia remains highly vulnera-
ble to low-key western interventions. Chechnya, which is within Russia, has been subjected to the
logic of the Central Asian pattern: Russia may protect her security interest and escape being mar-
ginalized only by surrendering larger claims and integrating with the US. Having made that stra-
tegic choice, she would be permitted room for manoeuvre in institutional and commercial compe-
titions.
VI
There are however three areas in which Russia would appear to be independent of such US
hegemony: these are with respect to the “rogues”, and to China, and India.
Putin has been ostentatious about his friendship and collaboration with Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea; and these appear to be traditional Russian self-assertion and challenges to the hyperpower
of the US. It should be evident at the outset that such a thesis is untenable. When Russia must su-
rrender positions in vital spheres like NATO expansion, the European Union,Yugoslavia, Central
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Asia, Transcaucasia and Chechnya, why should she exert herself in these marginal areas which
are calculated to provoke fits of apoplexy in the US? Briefly put, Russia is merely manoeuvring
for a better negotiating position.
To take the Iraq case first. Iraq owed Russia 11-12 billion US dollars dating from Soviet ti-
mes, and Russia regularly reminded the world that any US action in Iraq would have to take care
of Iraqi debts to Russia. To reinforce the case, Russia entered into some 67 agreements with Iraq
worth some 40 to 60 billion US dollars in August 2002. Iraq does not have the capacity to pay for
such projects and Russia was concluding such agreements on the eve of a major war. Iraq could
possibly calculate that the enormous scope of the agreements would stimulate Russia into at-
tempting to ward off or soften the US blow about to be delivered. Russia would likewise reckon
that it could demand compensation from the US after the war. On the other hand, were Saddam
Hussain to be removed without the regime being changed but emerging from the doghouse,
Russia would have benefited by having concluded so many agreements.
Russian collaboration with Iran would appear to be more offensive to the US. Russia has
been helping in nuclear energy generation. It could be a test of US opposition; it could also be to
make the US offer compensation, whether now or later when Iran is subjected to the same fate as
Iraq in the “axis of evil.” The US has indeed already offered compensation and negotiated with
Russia to help her industry and keep her off Iran. For example the U.S. offered to help dismantle
obsolete submarines and reduce chemical weapons stockpiles; to buy Russian “Afghan” helicop-
ters of the Mi-8 variety; to pay $20 billion for reprocessing nuclear waste over the next twenty ye-
ars; and NASA addressed the space lobby by suggesting payment for the services of Russians on
the International Space Agency. But all these were tied to Russia getting out of agreements with
Iran. Russia has been essentially bargaining in domains where she can bargain; it should not be
confused with strategic moves, at least not at the present.
VII
Russian relations with China have been dramatically improving, especially since 1995, and
with further energetic action by Putin. It is now called a strategic partnership, and the partners re-
gularly call for a multipolar world in lieu of the unipolar world dominated by the US. But besides
demilitarization, arms reductions, border demarcations, the driving force of the relationship has
been trade in arms and defence technologies, Russia supplying and China taking. Industrial colla-
boration is of limited significance because China is not attempting to upgrade its ancient Soviet
industry, in which Russia could have played a role; instead China is starting from scratch in mo-
dern high technology industries by importing from the West, for example aeroplanes from
Boeing or Airbus, not Tupolev, and collaboration with General Motors or Audi, not Lada. In the
energy sector however there is a complementarity of interests, Russia exporting gas and oil to a
China that requires ever greater volumes of such energy for modernization. Trade in arms and de-
fence technologies is however the bond between them. China is the biggest importer of both, and
Russia maintains a vigorous trade in the one sector that is internationally competititve. Russia
sees herself as about fifteen years ahead of China in such capabilities and therefore is sanguine
for the moment. Some aspects of the trade could be directed against the US also within narrow li-
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mits. The most important purchases are SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles,
and Sovremenny destroyers. Of these the Sovremenny destroyers would be especially significant
against US aircraft carriers near Taiwan should the need arise. This relationship seems to be subs-
tantially commercial rather than strategic; if it has strategic implications, it will be more a source
of worry to Russia herself than to the US. Both are keenly aware of the importance of bilateral re-
lations with the US; and the talk of a “strategic relationship” and of the multipolar world is more
an instance of expanding room for manoeuvre rather than of challenging the US. This is however
once instance of Russia breaking out of the overarching Russia-US relation, in that Russia is not
here obliged to improve her prospects by subordinating to the US and then working her way up.
The other one is with India. This is the oldest, most stable, and most independent relationship
that Russia enjoys. But like the Chinese, this has also become a chiefly commercial one after its
Cold War status as a genuinely strategic association. Again, India is a major importer of arms and
sundry technologies in the nuclear, space, and other crucial science and technology fields. As in
the case of China, here also the bilateral relationship with the USA takes precedence over all ot-
hers, including such a tried and tested one as this. This is not to suggest any deterioration; indeed
relations are of the best and there is little reason for them to be otherwise; but the international
context has shifted them from the strategic to the chiefly commercial. In these circumstances, one
important development is likely to occur. Russia has privileged the ties with India over anything
with Pakistan owing to the strategic factor during the Cold War, and that has substantially conti-
nued to this day. However, given the sweeping integration into American priorities, and if
America can conduct excellent bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan, Russia is very li-
kely to want to do the same. This is possible because the main strategic question of the binary
choices of the Cold War is out of the way; it is also attractive because Pakistan opens up commer-
cial possibilities, which Russia is desperately in need of at the moment. But this will not be at the
expense of good relations with India, which Russia would want to maintain rather than jeopar-
dize. It merely follows the general logic of Russia strategic calculations the world over.
177
SCE ANUARI VOL-18  17/5/04  12:41  Página 177
